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PREFFEAN TIAL ASSIGIMENTS OF INSOLVEIIT %OOP0IATIONS•
I. PRELLMI AY.- TPie numerous instances of corporate fail-
ures during te late period of financial stitingency., coupled
wit. tie fact ttat a majority of tqese failures have been
accompanied witi an attempt on te part of te managers 
or
officers to give preferences to certain creditors, over ot'ers
and in many instances to Vie stockiolders and directors of 
the
corporation tliemselves- gives enhanced interest to t'ie in-
quiry, wietier and to what extent Vie law will allQw a prefer-
ential transfer of property to be made by a corporation withi
failing circumstances.
The rigLt of an individual to give preferences a i as
never been questioned; and tie first case, (1) in w-.ic'. tie
validity of *preferential assignents by corporations was
questioned, seemed to h'ave taken tile learned court of Connect-
icut by surprise, for losner C. J. in delivering Pe opin-
ion of Ltie court, remarks'There exists no doubt tiat there
'iave been many instances of actually insolvent corporations,
w'Iere certain creditors bAave been preferred to othIers, and
tVe perfect silence till now, on tie subject of thiis fancied
(lh Catlin v. Eagle iBank, ( 6 Oonn. 233.)
7diversity," ( between an individual and a corporation) "is
powerful to shqow what has been the universal opinion."
II. DEFIITIOIS .- In the discussion of this question,
numerous factors are involved and to the better understan-
ding of the subject, it is first necessary to acertain the
meaning of (a) Voluntary assignment, (b) Preferential assign-
ments; (c) Insolvency, and (dl In contemaplation of insolvency.
(a) Voluntary assignments for the benefit of creditors
are transfers without compulsion of law, by debtors., of some
or all of their property, to an assignee or assignees, in trust
to apply the same, or t.e proceeds thereof, to the payment
of some, or all of their debts, and to return the surplus
if any, to tie debtor. (I)
(b) A preferential assignment may be defined as an
assignment of property for the benefit of creditors, made by
an insolvent debtor in which he has directed that a prefer-
ence C right to be paid first ) slall be given to a creditor
or creditors therein named.
(c) "Insolvency" says Brown J.a "is the inability of
a company and the inadequacy of its property to pay its debts,
and not a present inability to pay in cash or its equive-
(1) Burrill on Asmignments, Fifth 1Ed. p. 3, and app. in
Bertlett v. Teah, ( I M~c Crary 176.)
8lent." (I)
"A contpaplation of insolvency is wbiere a debtor, tav-
ing full knowledge of iis embarrassed circumstances, hias no
ope or expectation of relief, and anticipates an entire
failure in business, and absolute insolvency; or wviere Ais
circumstances are such., tiat any prudent man, taking a reason-
able view of his situation, and of tie surrounding circumstan-
ces, mighit at any time fairly expect insolvency to follow."(2)
From t'iese definitions it must necessarily follow, t'at
notwitstanding tie preasure of great embarrassments, if a
debtor corporation entertains an honest intention and expec-
tation, in tqe exercise of reasonable intelligence, of weati-
ering tie storm, of going on witl his business, and paying
all its debts, its acts cannot be brouglt witiin tie pro-
visions of a statute proqibiting preferences.
III. T{E ?IG1T TO P;EFE{.-- In t'ie absence of stptutory
pro',ibitions or resrrictions to the contrary, a corporation
%ias tie same right to make an assignment and to give pref-
erences as an individual. W.atever may be t ougkIt of tqe
justice of allowing a debtor to make an assignmaent wit i
preferences, its legality at comixon law is indidputable.
"laying an unquestionable power of preference, of W-iic. ihe
is thie absolute master, it follows t .at 'xe nay s et iis price
(1) and (2) 0urtislkv. Leavit, (15 EI. Y. 150.)
9upon it, provided it is not a reservation 
of part of tVvie
effects for Aimself, or anytlhing t'at 
would carry is power
beyond a mere preference." (I)
Upon tje ri3gt of an insolvent corporation to prefer 
one
creditor to another, t'qe case of Catlin v. 
Eagle Bank of 'New
°{aven ,cited supra, decided in 1826, is tefirst of any note
in this country and is continually being cited as a leading
case. Tie bank, 'ihaving become insolvent assigned to one
of its customers $52000. in nOtes, gave im a mortgage on
real estate for $2QOO. and paid 'ikim $15000. in money.
The amount of t'ie deposit tilus secured was eighty or ninety
tViousand dollars. It does not appear whether tie bank
ceased to be a going concern, but only tAat it was actually
insolvent, wien te preference was made. "t'Ike corporation
aad authority to purciase, hiold and convey property, with th.e
usual banking powers super-added: and the directore were 
au-
thorized to dispose of and manage its moneys, credits and
property, and to regulate its concern in all cases not spec-
ially provided for." To t~lis general grant tiere is neitkter
exception nor limitation, "except that t'te cviarter is alter-
able,amendable, and revocable at tihe pleasure of the legis-
I ature ."
(I) Tihonas V. Jenks, (5 3,awle(Pa.) 221)
The question befo'e tie court for consideration was
wietter tie directors of tLe corporation after it Aad become
actually insolvent, can make payment or give security to one
of its creditors and iave anothter unpaid and witkLout secur-
ity. And Ule court answered t e question in tie affirma-
tive. In tie course of Iis opiniQD, osmer C.J. said,
"A corporation is an artificial person; and thiis designation
is given it by reason of its resemblance to a natural person,
in respect to its rigqts, powers, and legal duties. It is
difficult for me to conceive, Wiere no restraint is inter-
posed in a charter of incorporation, on Wiat ground, L".e
general autqoriLy delegated, is subject to exceptions or
fettered by restrictions from wiici an individual or an
tercl.antile company are free. And t.is difficulity is much
increased as no case intimating tis diversity between cor-
porations and individuals 1Ias been cited, nor can be found
by my utmost researches............ The cases of an individual
and a corporation in Vie matter under discussion, it appears
to me, are not merely analagous but identical, and I discern
no reason for te cligi.itest difference between them. The
exists no doubt that there have been many instances of
actually insolvent corporations, wh~ere certain creditors 'aave
been preferred to others, and the perfect silence till now,
on t'ar subject of ti is fancied diversity, is powerful to show
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wiat 'has been te universal opinion."
The argument of the Court in tis case proceeds upon
tbqe ground t~iat any insolvent corporation may make an assign-
ment wit'ljpreferences, and upon t r ground that the cases of
an individual and a corporation are " not merely analagous
but identical .' A corporation merely insolvent and one that
ias become so insolvent, tiat it can no longer transact bus-
ness; or that tie directors or managers, by reason of its in-
solvency, Aave decided to wind up its business and dissolve
it; ttese two classes are put upon tie same footing. The
Court does not seem to grasp t.is distinction; nor tie one
between an individual and corporation. The insolvency of
a corporation is practically te end if its business carear,
being tge equivelent to the death of an individual . An
individual, upon becoming insolvent retains possession of Ais
property until voluntarily or involuntarily disposed of.
The creditors of a corporation tave the entire beneficial
interest in its assets, tie entire property interests there-
in, except the rigt to Possession and tVe naked legal title.
An individual being stripped of -ijis property, leaving qis
debts unpaid, hkas still anotkaer Business carear Before im3
wip'. his Property, afterwards acquired, liable for The unpaid
residue Of h.is debts. UJoxn Pe inlsolvency of a corporation
tie fiction of its being a person is partly t~'rown off or
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discarded; actually no sucq person ever existed, and tAis fact
is recognized to a certain extent, so that te ficticious
person no longer bas either actual possession of tie corpor-
ate assets, nor any beneficial interests thereiln, but mere-
ly t te naked legal title; while tte directors Aavc possession
and the creditors te. entire beneficial interest. The court
in te case of Catlin v. able Bank, seems to b.ave overlook-
ed these distinctions, but it entertained grave fears tiat
if it establishied trie rule tbqat an insolvent corporation
could not prefer its creditors, great inconvenience would
result to trading corporations, and tieir usefulness muci
impaired.
lad tae courts in the early stages of the evolution of
corporation law, recognized tese fundamental differences
between an insolvent individual and an insolvent corporation,
it is doubtful if tilis inequitable doctrine of preferences
would ever 'ihad existed to any great extent, in our corporation
l aw.
Another leading case holding tihe right of a corporation
to give preferences is, Buell v. Buckingham 
() dcided in
1864. The corporation owed one }uell over 
7500. for money
previously advanced y him and in the consideration 
of a
(I) Buell v. Buckingiam, 16 Iowa 284.
conveyance to kcim of five or six tousand dollars wort. of
property, lie agreed to pay tie debts of tie cnrporation
amounting to nearly $2O00. and apply tie remainder on 'is
claim. The corporation also owed iim $2000. worti of
stock, w'iic tqey -qad promised but never issued to him.
The court 'ield tiat tVe corporation might thus prefer iim.
But it is to be observed in t ie language of Coe J,, tliat,
"tere is no evidence in tqe case, that t e corporation was
insolvent, or tiat te sale to Buell embraced all its prop-
erty, but if suci facts were shown, since t'te transaction
was an absolute sale in good fait.,, for a valueable consider-
ation and not a mortgage, a pledge or an assignment, witi
any contingent interest remaining in tqe grantor it cannot
under tte decisions of this court be held a general assign-
ment, and tierefore void."
lotwitA standing t'Ie disfavor in wiicb. preferences are
'ield by some courts, t'ie doctrine of tie majority of t'e cases
is tiat, corporations wien insolvent, or in contemplation of
insolvency, may dispose of t'ieir assets so as to prefer fav-
ored creditors, altioug1 L'ie result may leave nothing for
ot'iers, whio stand on a footing equally meritorious. (1)
ri)' ifloe v. Biscoe, 13 Ark. 563, 575;
Covert v. ' ogers, 38 Mici. 363;
Qoats v. Donnell, 94 1N. Y. 168;.
13
14
IV. TIE 1G'IT TO P1EFER $TOCYI0LDER8 .-- In considering
te right of corporations to prefer creditors generally,
stockiolders bave usually been regarded as outside .creditors,
and preferences to them, Verefore valid, but in tie present
instance, it -ias been thought wise to treat tem separately.
That stockilolders are allowed to receive preferences in
some jurisdictions, is unquestioned. Thus, in Sargent v.
Webster, (1) wqere tie directors of a manufacturing cor-
poration voted tiat an assignment of all te property of tie
corporation stould be made to Sargent, one of the stock-
Aolders ( w~io was liable for a large amound as indorser for
tVe corporation) for te payment of qis endorsment, and
Dana v. Bank of U. S., 5 W. . (Pa.) 2231
Warner v. Mower, 11 Vt. 390.
Garet v. Ploughi.ovo., 70 Iowa 697.
Wilkinson v. Bauerl e, 41 N. J. R. 635, s.c. 7 AtR.ep5l4
Allis v. Jones, 45 Fed.Rep.148:
Warfield v. Marshiall Co. Canning Co. 72 Ia. 660
compare witi Barrings v. Dabney 1. WaI. 1.
Smith v. Skeary, 47 Conn. 47.
(a) Sargent v. Web ster, 1 3 lketcal f (Mass.) 497.
aut~lorized tqe treasurer to make sucA an assigrinent, and.
sign it as treasurer. The treasurer made a deed of release
and quit claim to sargent of all t~e property, real and
personel of the corporation, and constituted Sargent te
attorney of tIe corporation, to sue for an recover all mon-
eys due, and all property belonging to tte corporation.
This conveyance was objected to on te ground that it tended
to give a preference to a stockholder and thus a fraud aginst
creditors. But Siaw C. J.,said,"SucA a conveyance would
now be fraudulent, if made by an individual, because it would
be repugnant to tkte spirit and letter of tie insolvent
laws. But as corporations are not subject to tie insol-
vent laws and the law stands, in regard to them as it did
before, these provisions do not apply."
A transfer of t-.is kind would be fraudulent if made by
an individual because"repugnant to thqe letter and spirit
of tbhe insolvent laws; but as corporations are on a better
footing tan individuals, as tey were not subject to tie
insolvent laws ar as tieir acts were in furt'Ierance of tqe
purposes of the corporation, to wit: to pay its debts, and
go on successfully wit_ its business, or to wind it up, and
settle-on terms most advantageous to thie stocklholclers-tvhe cour
sustained t~ie assignment.
In anothier jurisdiction thiere is also a case olding
16
that the stock-tolders of a corporation,fwijo avail themselves
of their superrior advantages for the purpose of obtaining
security, from the property of thke corporation for debts due
tVemselves, are not thereby guilty of fraud, in contebplation
of law so as to render tiemselVes personally liable to the
creditors. (1)
V. TIE RIGIT TO P-1EFEt D -FjCTOS .-- The doctrine that
a corporation may prefer creditors, has been carried to the
extent in absence of statutory provisions to the contrary,
that it may even prefer its own directors in Arkansas, Con-
necticut, Iowa, and 1!ichigan. (2) "This infamous doctrine",
says M!y. Thompson,(3) "has been pushed to the extcnt of allow-
ing directors and shareholders of a corporation to prefer
themselves at the expense of its creditors at large, although
(1) VfTitwell V. Warner, 20 Vt. 425;
Reichwald v. Commertial 'otel 0o., 106 111. 439.
(2) Smith v. Skeary, 47 Conn. 47;
,allins v. Sharer 0o., 80 Iowa 380;
Bank of Montreal V. Potts Co., 90 Mich. 345;
Gould v. Little %lck Co., 52 Fed sep. (Ark.) 680;
Wortheflv. Griffith, 28 S. W. (Ark.) 286.
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te directors or sqareholders may Aave 
voted for the propo-
sition." (1)
1A7. Thompson continues in condemning t'is "infamous doc-
trine" " It cannot escape attention tat tis 
doctrine of-
fers a new inducement to t'le corporations 
of every species
of business, because it (rives the members of 
corporations an
advantage over teir creditors 
w'tichi the members of a partner-
sq.ip do not possess. A partnerskqip cannot distribute 
its
assetts t6 its partners in preference to its creditors;
but under this miserable doctrine, if it becomes incorpor-
ated, it can do so."
Tie analogy between a corporation and a partnersiip in
t uis regard is not very clear. Distinctions w.icu seem to
iave escaped Mr. T ompson, placed te directors of corpor-
ations and members of partners1ips in two entirely different
catagories. In the first place the reason wviy a partnersbhip
cannot prefer its partners is simply that it cannot owe one
of its partners; and waere Lvtere is no debt, there can be no
debtor to make a preference, and no creditor to be preferred;
second, tvtere is a personal obligation attachting to each.
partner to pay all the debts of Ltie partners'uip; wuile direc'
(1) Warfiejld v.1 ,arsuall Co. Canning Co., 72 Ia. 666;
Foster V. i, ullanphy Plaining M~ill Co., 92 Mo. 79.
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tors as suc are under n, common law liabil iLy to pay any
of tb e debts of te corporation; and finally, if we discard
tie idea if a ficticious person, and look upon the-corporation
as composed of individual members, even then the directors
would be merely the managing partners of the company, and if
a preference to a creditor is to be held void on the ground
of a debtor preferring iimself, then an assignment preferring
a stockholder, must be held void for the same reason; with
which conclusion many jurists are hearty accord, but their
position cannot be susLained on the authorities.
Jowever unfortunate Mr. Thompson may have been in his
selection of comparisons, or Aowever unsoknd his reasoning
iis conclusions seem to be just; for it is difficult to
understand the reasoning upon Wiich preferences to direc-
tors are to be substantiated.
In the early cases of preferentiel assignments of corpor
ations, Vie broad general statement was continually being made
that a corporation could make assigrents and give preferen-
ces as fully and to te same extent as natural persons,
without exception or modification as to directors, simply
because that point was not involved in the case, While it is
very probable that suci. exception would v ave been made, had
that been a point in issue. It is in this account, viz.
of relying so strongly on such broad and general statements
19
made without exception, restriction or modification 
that we
find this extreme view in Arkansas. Iowa, Connecticut and
Mic- igan.
Attempts have been made from time to time to put this
doctrine upon a logical basis, and many reasons Aave been ad-
vanced for its existence. For example, Taft J. in Brown vs.
Grand 'apids Furniture Co. (1), gives us the following reason:
But we do not find any reason why, if a corporatioA may pre-
fer one creditor over others, it may not prefer a director,
who is a bona fide creditor. Preferences are not based on
any equitable principle. They go by favor, and as an i*-
dividual nay prefer among iis creditors his friens and relat-
ives, so a corporation may prefer its friends."
It will be seen that this reasoning is not well founded;
it is not based upon any priaciple; and it makes use of a com-
parison, t~e individual, faulty and erroneous w1fen applied
Lo corporations. But in the Arkansas Supreme Court. we find
au attempt to defend this doctrine upon general principles.
In Worthen v. 2rriffi t*, (2), we find the following: U The
directors of a corporation are neither trustees nor agents of
(1) Brown v. g rand 3%apids ?urniture o., 58 Fed. %ep.286.
(2) worthen v. Griffith, 28 8. VT. ( Arkb.) 286.
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the creditors, and tLiey do not occupy a fiduciary relation to
them...... Tie very fact that preferences are made, s'oWs
always tbhat tie party making t em is biased more or less. to-
ward trie person in w qose favor t .ey are made. As long as
preferences are allowed to be made by insolvent debtors, tiey
will be dictated more or less by thqe bias of tie person making
tiem. The individual debtor whien insolvent and forced to
make an assig.%nent, generally prefers jis friends, and often
members of Ais own family. The ome creditor and neigibor
is preferred at ie expense-of t.e non-resident, one perqaps
equally deserving..... The contention that tie estate of ax
insolvent debtor sould be dispersed by some one acting
withiout bias or personal interest, would apply almost as
well to tAe case of an assiginent of an insolvent individ-
ual or partnerseaip as tliat of a corporation, and if adopted.
would result in forbid( i ng all preferences in assignmeats
by insolvent debtors, a result tiat migbit be productive of
muchi good but it is one tiat ti.e courts must leave to t~te wis-
dom of the legislature to accomplish."
Tis reasoning is unsound bot'l on reason and autqority,
so far as at denies the fiduciary relation existinv: between
directors and creditors.
"The capital stock of a moneyed corporation" says 1%.
Justice luat in tie case of Upton v. Trivilock,"iatrs
fund of w iichi tie directors are trustees. It is a trust
to be managed for thie benefit of its stockliolders- during its
life, and for tie benefit of creditors in Vie event of dis-
olution." (1 )
Also in Beac. v. Miller (2), t ie court said,"So long as a
corporation remains solvent its directors are agents or trus-
tees for Vie sijarelolders. But the moment a corporation be-
comes insolvent its directors occupy a differext relation.
The assets of Vie corporation must thex be regarded as a trust
fund for Pie payment of its creditors, and tAe directors
occupy ti.e position of trustees and a fiduciary relation ex.-
ists ."
As before indicated sliarp distinctions are to be
drawn between t ie cases in wiic'- a corporation, t-ougl ac-
aCtually insolvent, secures a director wit _ an actual and
reasonable expectation of paying its debts and continuing
its business, or in Wiic i a director receives payment or
takes security comtemporaneously wit i making sales or advax-
ces. Keeping tese distinctions in. mind it is safe to say
tViat Arkansas , Coxnecticut, lIowa. and Mic*iigan stand alone
in tie exceptional doctrine above treated.
(1) Upton v. Tribilock, 91 U. S. 56.
(2) B3eac'i V. Miller, 130 111. 162, l 90.
There are also a few decisions in tle lower courts of
Ney York City, .olding tat a director of an insolvent cor-
poration being also a creditor may receive a preference
over ot~ioer creditors. (1)
"The-e cases cannot be ield to settl& tie law in New
York, as to te rigft of a director of an insolvent foreign
corporation to obtain a preference frrn. its property in this
State, by either voluntary or involuntary transfer, on com-
mon law principles assuming tl-iat t'le statutes of Nqrw York
as to preferences by insolvent corporations are not appli-
cable to foreign corporations." (2)
Th-e text writers almost unanimously attack this doctrine
witl great vigor. (3)
(I) fill v. Knickerbocker,Electric Co., 45 'E.1; Y. S. .761
Lane Vo WIeelrigat , 69 lun 180.
Worhington v. Pfster Co., 3 ITisc. 418.
11c Queen v. New, 10 iisc. 251
(2) Professor d. A. Coll in, in Vol. I. eo.2 1.Y.L*;.p.81.
(3 Taylor. on Corp. 3ed. Secs. 668,759,
eCook on 8 tock I.. 3ed. secs. 661-2
Spelling on Corps. seca. 714,909.
Morawetz, on Corps. secs. 787-.8;'
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Upon te doctrine laid down in tie quotatiols,(PP- 20,
21.) toere are numerous authorities, supportiag it, tie cor-
sideration of Wqich leads to tAe discussion of,
V I&- TAE T3UST FUND DOCT9aINE Opposed to tje courts of
Arkansas, Connecticut, Iowa, and Mic1igan stand tie courts
of Oiio, Tennessee, Texas, and Wasiington, asserting tA-e
equally exceptional doctrine tiat te assets of an insolvext
corporation are a trust fund for tie benefit of t-ie creditors
ratably.
This doctrine com.ionly knowx as te "American Doctrine"
)ias given rise to mucd confusion of ideas as to its real
tneaning and muc"i conflict of decision in its applieation. (i)
The Trust Fund doctrine, so calledwas invented by Mr.
Justice storyin thie case of Wood v. Druimner (2). This case
did not demand any sucri inventiow, it being a case of fraud
upon creditors upon old and faniliar principles of law. A
bark devided up two ti.irds of its capital among its stock-
hiolders, witv.out providing funds sufficient to pay its nut-
standing creditors. In thte course of 'is opinion, 1r. Jus-
tice Story says'-"It appears very clear to me upon general
(1) Two 11. W. L. '3ev. p. 169.
(2) Wood v. Drummer, 3 Mason 308.
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principles,, as well as the legislative intention, t.at te
capital stock of banks is to be deemed a pledge or trust
fund for tie payment of te debts contracted by tke bank.
The Public, as well as tie legislature, have always supp-
osed tbis to be a fund appropriated for suc)a purpose. The
individual stockholders are not liable in teir private cap-
acities. The charter releive- tziem from personal responsi-
bility, and substitutes te capital in its stead; credit is
universally given to this fund by tAe public as te only
means of repayment. During te existence of tie corporation
it is tVe sole property of ti.Ie corporation, and c~n be applied
only according to its ciarter, ti.at is a fund for the pay-
ment of its debts, upon Me security of wice'i it may discount
and circulate notes. Wi.y otherwise is any capital stock
required by our carters? If the capital stock, May the
next day after it is paid in, be withdrawn by tbe stock"ipolders
wit i.out payment of the debts of tie corporation, wiy is this
amount so studiously provided for? and its payment so dilli-
gently required? To me Liis point seems so plain upon prin-
ciples of law as well as common sense, that I cannot be
brougbht into any doubt, th.at the ch~arters of our bank s, make
t~te capital stock a trust fund, for the payment of all The
debts of the corporation. The vbili'iolders and other creditov
bhave tkie first claim upon it; and thie stockholders have no
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rigits until all thie otber creditors are satisf ied. They
Aav ethe full benefit of all Vhe pfofits made by "the estab-
lisvment; and cannot take any portion of the fund, until all
other claims on it are extinguis'ed.'
Wftat t-1.e eminent jurist meant by tese propositions
n.as been Vie cause of muchi controversy among t'e members of
tie bencA and bar. It ias been said tiat 1r. Story meant
merely, tqat corporate property must be first appropriated
to t'ae payment of the debts of tAe corporatian before tere
can be any distrobution of it among tie stocr'rolders. This
seems to be a rationable and reasonable construction of hie
proposition as laid down in Wood v. Drummer,supra, and as a
proposition itself Aas never been disputed. This view is
sustained in Fogg v. Blair, (1)
Notwitistanding te evident intent of Judge Story and
te version placed upon the trust fund doctrine in tie au-
tiorities cited above, many cases AaV followed blindly and"
implicitly tie fraze, 'That the capital stock of t-ie cerpor-
ation is a trust fund for te benefit of all creditors rat-
ably.'
Thus, in Sanger v. Upton , (2) Mr Justice Swain lays it
(1) Fogg v. Blair, 33 U. 8. 541.
(2 anger v. UpLon, 91 U. S. 56.
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down tat, "Tie capital stock of an incorporated company 
is
a fund set apart for the payment of its debts. It is a
substitute for tte personal liabilities wkicA. subsist in
private co-partnersip. Vh1en debts are incurred, a contest
arises with t~e creditors tqat it shall not be withidrawn or
I
applied otierwise tqan upon teir demands until sucht demands
are satisfied. The creditors have a lien upon it in equity;
if diverted tqey can follow it as far as it can be traced, and
subject it Lo thte payment of tleir claims, except as aginst
hiolders wio ave taken it bona fide for a valueable consider-
ation without notice." (1
(1) Curran v. Arkansas, 15 'ow. 312;
Upton v. Tribilock, 91 U. s. 45,
Taylor v. Miami Pxp. Co.,5 Obhio St. 165,
Adams v. B1illing Co., 35 Fed. ,ep. 433,
Louse v. o4erGhants atl Bk. 46 Ci.io st. 493,
followed in,
Smiti Co. v. ?Ac -roarty, 136 U. S. 237,
Marr v. Bank, 4 Coldw. (Tenn) 471,
i-oseby v. Will iamuson, 5 Iusk (Tenn.) 278,
Leipold V. Marrony , 7 Lea (Tenn.) 128,
Lyons-Thomas Co v. Perry store Mfg. Co. 86 Tex 143,
Canover V. l owe, 39 Pac. Wash. 741.
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In these cases the capital stock of a corporation is
held to be a trust fund for thie benefit of all creditors
ratably. This necessarily raises t e questions-ia) Xrhat
is necessary to create a valid trust ? And (b) Does t'iis
come witbiin tie meaning ? And first as to a trust. In te
proper sense of t te term no trust is created. A trust always
implies two estates, one legal and the other equitable ; it
implies two personages holding tese two estates or interests,
one person called trustee qolding t'v.e legal, and anothier
called cestui qut trust -as t'e eqitable interest.
Second: The application of t'lis conception of a trust to thie
case in hand. The capital stock of a corporation is its
own property; it -olds Lte legal title and Aas thie benefic-
ial interest; it "tas absolute power of disposition-and this is
incompatible witi t'ie generally accepted idea of a trust.(l)
The following extract from tie opinion of Mr Justice
Brewer in Tillins v. Brierfield Coal Co., (2), is exactly
in noint. "Vh.ile it is true language ".as been frequently
used to tie effect tiat tie assets ot tie corporation are a
trust fund .held by a corporation' for t'he benefit of creditors,
tilis 'tas not been to convey thie idea thtat thiere is a direct
and express trust attached to t .e property."
(1) lospes v. Car Co., 5o 1 . WJ. 1117,
(2) loll ins v. JBrierfield Coal Co., 150 IT.. 3. 371.
Again in Vol. II. Pueroy's Equity Jur. Sec. 1046, they
"are not in any true and complete sense trusts, and can only
be called so by way of analogy or metaphior."
lowever misleading may -tave been tLe p'rase, the capital
stock of a corporation constitutes a trust £ind for Vhe ben-
efit of all creditors ratably, since Vie decisions in hie
two cases of ollins v. Brierfield Coal10o. and tospes v.
Car Co., tAere seems but little reason whty any one should be
led astry by t ie term "trust fund" as used in Vie case of
Wood v. Drummer. The directors were called trustees for t-ie
benefit of creditors after a corporation Aad become insol-
vent because it is said, te insolvency of a corporation
maKes the corporate property a trust fund, and therefore makes
thie directors trustees of t'iatfund. But t-e two casses
last above cited, shiow thiat Vie trust is "ratier a trust in
the administration of te assets after possession by a court
of Equity, tan a trust attac~ing to Vie property as suchI,
for tie direct benefit of either creditors or stockhlolders."
A trust in te administration of the assets is no trust at
all, but simply a rule governing he court in he distrobu-
tion of h ose assets. And it is a well settled principle
of tkie law of partnershiip, whiere tiere is asimilar trust in
the administration of assets, there is no trust thaL can be
enforced until h~e property hias passed in custodian l egis. (1)
Case v. Beauregardq 99 U. S. 119, 125.
V I I .- TIE PREVAILIEG D0C'f'UIiE . -- Between te two
extremes above considered lies the unquestioned weight of
authority, asserting t' e common law rigit of a corporation to
prefer its creditors as freely as a natural person, denying
only ti.e riglat of a director to obtain or receive preferences
over ot'er creditors. (1) The States Lolding tiis doctrine
deny tIe riglt of a director to receive or obtain a preference
over ot".er creditors for a two fold reson, viz: (first) tie
trust fund doctrine, and econd) tie fiduciary relation
(1) Sutton I:fg. Co. v. Iutcqingson, 63 Fed iep. 4964
Boswort, v. Jacksonville ,64 Fed. Qep., 615,
Smiti v. Putnam ,'IN. -1. 632,
till v. Pioneer Co., 18 S. E. 107,
Sicardi v. Keystone Oil Co., 149 Pa. St. 148,
Craig's P.pp. 92 Pa. St. 396,
iopkins App. , 90 Pa. st. 69,
Olney v. Conanicut Land Co., 16 -. I. 597,
Lamb v. Laughlin, 25 W. Va. 300,
Corey v. Wadswort- , 99 Ala. 68.
Lowry Co. v. f-'.pire Co., 91 Ga. (324,
Butler Paper Co. v. Robbins, 151 [11- 588,
Lays v. Citizens Banik, 51 Kansas 535.
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Both of these reasons for denying a preference to 
direc-
tors are well statd in one of the latest and most authora-
tive decisions on te subject,( Sutton Mfg- Co. V. tutching-
son), which arose in Indiana. I quote from the opinion of
Justice larlan as follows "The contention of the defend, ants
is that in disposing of their respective properties ,an
individual and a corporation were recognized at common law
as having equal rigits; and. as the former may, in the absence
of a statute forbidding it, transfer the whole or part of his
property with the intention or with the effect of giving a
preference to some of his creditors tothe exclusion of ot'ers,
so an insolvent corporation, when financially embarrassed and
not intending to continue its business, may make a prefer-
ence among its creditors, whoever ti.ey may be, and watever
their relation to the corporation or to the property trans-
ferred. If this be a sound rule, it would follow t'hat direc-
tors, being also creditors, of an insolvent corporation, w ich
Aas abandoned te objects of its creation and ceased an active
exittence, may distribute among t'iemselve its entire assets,
if the reasonable value t-ereof does not exceed their aggre-
gate demands. We cannot accept this view. In our judg-
ment, when a corporation becomes insolVent and intends not to
prosecute its business, or does not expect to make furth.er
efforts to accomplish the objects of its creation, its mana-
31
ging officers or directors come under a duty to distribute
its property or its proceeds ratably among all creditors,
having regard of course to valid liens or c-arges previously
placed upon it. Their duty is to act up to the end or de-
sign" for whicvL the corporation was created ( lBl. Comm. 480.)
and when they can no lomger do so their function is to hold
or distribute tie property in their hands for the equal bene-
fit of those entitled to. it. Because of the existence of
this duty in respect to a common fund in tqeir uiands to be
administered, tqe law will rtt.-]erthit them, al though creditoI5
/
to obtain any peculiar advantage for themselves to the preju-
dice of other creditors. This rule is imperatively demanded
by the principle that one who has the posseesionJib aed control-
of property for the benefit of others- and surely an insol-
vent corporation, which has ceased to do business, holds itd
property for the benefit of creditors- may not dispose of it f
for his own special advantage to the injury of any of those
I
for whom it is held. That principle pervades the entire law
regulating the condubt of those who hold fiduciary relations
to others, and, instead of being relaxed, should bc rigidly
enforced in cases of Breach of duty or trust by corporate man-
a 'i-rs sr'eking t9 enrich themselves, at the expense of those
who have an interest equally with tlemselves in the property
committed by law to their control. It would be difficult to
overstate the mischieveous results of a contrary rule, as
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applied to tbose entrusted with t-ie management of corporate
property....•
As in t'xe absence of a statute prescribing a contrary
rule, creditors of a private corporation cannot look for teir
security to the private estate either of It.e corporators or
of tose w'o manage its property, t.e only recourse of cred-
itors, w-qen a corporation is dissolved or becomes insolvent
and ceases to prosecute its business, is te property in the
)iands of its managing officers. The law in effect says to
all wao deal with private corproations that thiey must look to
its property as Vie only security for the fulfillment of its
obligations; and, if thielaw givee this assurance to creditors
of a corporation, tose w'io are autqorized to represent it in
its dealings withi tbe public, who control and manage its
property. and upon whose fidelity and integtity t~qe public as
well as creditors rely, ought not to be permitted, wVien tAe
corporation becomes insolvent and abandones t.e objects for
wqichi it was created, to appropriate to tiemselves Was credi-
tors any more of tlae common fund in Xeir iands tqan is
ratably tieir s1are. If, upon becoming insolvent , a corpor-
ation smiould invoke Die aid of a Court of Equity for thie dis-
tribution of its assets, creditors Would be paid parri passu
in ratable proportions. Those, thierefore, whio kold fiduciary
relations to creditors oughit not to be allowed by any form of
/
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proceeding, or by their ofn act, after t'te corporation 
is
practically extinct, to appropriate its property 
for t"eir
special benefit, to tie injury of those who, upon cVery prin-
ciple of justice, 'iave equal rig.ts with. 
thiemselves-"
V I I I .-- OOI1CLUSO .--- 1early every State in t~e Union
-as passed laws, restricting, more or less the right of an
insolvent corporation to prefer creditors and more especially
tihe rig'tt to prefer its own directors, and even in thtose State
where preferences are all owed, t'hey are looked upon witA
disfavor, and tie text writers cave een almost unanmoous in
attacking te right wit evenmore vgor tan t e courts
w'k~ick reject it.
Wait, at Sec. 162, says:- "The practical worving of th.e
rule sustaining corporate preferences is monstrous, Unpre-
ferred creditors iave only a t wt or a shadow left to Wunich
resort can be had for payment of their claims; a soulless,
ficticious, unsu1stantial entity that can be neitfr seen nor
found. The capital and assets of te corporation, the
creditors trust fund, may under this rule, be carved out and
apportioned among a cosen fiew, usually the family connect-
ions or immediate friends of the officers making tie prefer-
ence. This rule of law is entitled to take precedece ,
among the many reckless absurdities to be met wit in te
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cases affecting corporationsq as being a manifest travesty
upon natural justice."
Taylor at Sec. 668,says :-"To allow a corporation to
make an assignment of its property, giving apreference to a
porLion'of its creditors over otiners, is unjust, as well as
utterly repugnant to te doctrine thtat corporate property is
a trust fund, on te credit of wbficht persons contract witi
tVe corporation."
Alt'liougi tLese aut'.orities urge te trust fund doctrine
as one of tte reasons aginst preferences, wiich doctrine was
exploded in tie case of lospes v. Car Co., still, teir con-
clusions are worthy of notice, as showing tie disfavor in
w'Ic. preferences, as a Wiole, are )eld.
In tvLe early case.' allowing a corporation to make an
assignment witvi preferences, notably, Catlin v. Fagle Bk.,
tb.e rigv"t was based upon the supposed analogy between an
insolvent individual and an insolvent corporation- and folflow-
ing this falacious reasoning, they stated it in broad g:ener-
al terms tat a corporation could prefer creditors as freely
and to tie same extent as an individual, not even excepting a
director, simply because tiue point was nr~t raised in 'Uhie case.
The result is, we uave the assets of a corporation zsposed of
according to the caprice or whirn of 'tbe debtor, excluding
some creditors, as meritorious at least, as the preferred
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ones; as a result also, we iave that anomoly in 
American
Jurisprudence, t. Trtst Fund doctrine, invented in 
a case
calling for no sucd invention. Consequently our corporation
law in regard to t'ie distrobution of corporate assets after
insolvency, is in a ratler of a c.aotic state; on tie one
land we liave States, following blindly t'qe flacious reason-
ing of Catlin v. Eagle Bk., and asserting t ie doctrine tiat
directors may receive preferences to the same extent as out-
side creditors; and, on tie ot.er Vand we liave courts asser-
ting tie equally exceptional doctrine that te asseLs of a
corporation are a trust fund for the benefit of all creditors
ratably,-The Trust Fund Doctrine.
Tis doctrine of allowing preferences is not based upon
any idea of justice or equity, but its justification is to
be found in tie reverence tqe comonI law judges *.ad for
precident, and the fear tiey entertained of impairing t-ie
usefulness of trading corporations, were tey to forbid pref-
erences; but public opinion is rapidly turning aginst ttis
umjust and inequitable doctrine, and, undoubtedly it will
.soon be supplanted by a more equitable one, "a result tiat
mig~t be productive of muci. good, but it is one that tie
courts must leave to the wisdom of tie legislatures to
( ortien v. riffitl, 28 S. W. 286.(i )
